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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004629

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: DCM AND PM'S COS DISCUSS PM'S SPEECHES, POLITICAL
IMPASSE, AND MILITIAS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Deputy Chief of Mission Ambassador Daniel Speckhard hosted Dr. Tariq Abdullah, Chef of Staff to the Prime Minister, for an informal working dinner on December 17, 2006 to discuss follow up to the Prime Minister's speech the previous day at the National Reconciliation Summit. The COS recognized that the GOI was not yet organized to ensure implementation of the initiatives mentioned by the PM, previewed that the PM would soon deliver a second speech focused on enhancing security, sought assistance to press the political blocs to propose ministerial candidates for the Sadrist-dominated ministries, and offered that the PM was increasingly authorizing GOI-only raids against militias in Baghdad.

¶2. (C) Dr. Tariq recognized the importance of acting on the Prime Minister's words at the December 16 National Reconciliation Summit, but the GOI was not yet organized internally to ensure implementation of key initiatives. The DCM offered suggestions and Embassy assistance; they agreed to stay in touch on how to operationalize the Prime Minister's speech.

¶3. (C) The COS noted that the Prime Minister's security speech would take place soon. The PM was grateful that President Bush has delayed his major speech on Iraq policy until January, allowing the PM to lay out his initiatives in advance. Dr. Tariq recognized the high Congressional concern about Iraq, as the PM had just met CODEL McCain/Lieberman and CODEL Kerry/Dodd.

¶4. (C) Dr. Tariq underscored that the Prime Minister was becoming impatient with the political blocs' stalling on putting forward new Ministers for Sadr-dominated ministries. He accused the PM's political opponents of actively trying to undermine the government through their inaction on filling key posts. The COS solicited the U.S. Embassy's assistance in pressing the political blocs to provide names for ministers quickly.

¶5. (C) In response to the DCM reiterating our desires to see sustained action against militias, Dr. Tariq emphasized that he was spending the bulk of his time on security issues. He insisted that the Prime Minister was committed to acting against militias, explaining that he recently authorized several operations to move against JAM targets in Sadr City. The COS explained that, given concerns about leaks, the PM's office maintained a direct, operational line to GOI special forces based at Baghdad International Airport through which the PM could order such raids.
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